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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 16777

-vSALVADOR P. TOSCANO, SR.,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the State of Utah
against

the Appellant to recover public assistance payments

received by him from having supplied the state agency with
factually incorrect information.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial before the lower court was held with the
court granting judgment in favor of the State of Utah in
the amount of $2,921.00.

(R. 82).

The trial court held

that the judgment represented public assistance the Appellant
had obtained to which he was not entitled because of
Appellant having supplied factually incorrect information
to the State of Utah (R. 82).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the District Court's
decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant came from Texas in the spring of 1975
for the purpose of finding work in Utah.
the onion and beet fields

(R. 104).

He found work in

After arriving and while

working, he injured his knee, requiring medical care.

(R.

104),

After the injury, in June, 1975, appellant applied
and was approved for public assistance benefits from the
State of Utah in the form of Food Stamps for each month from
June, 1975, through June, 1976.

In December of 1975, Mr.

Toscano applied for additional cash assistance from the state
and received that assistance monthly through June, 1976.
Total assistance recelved for Food Stamps was $2,846.00, and
for cash assistance was $2,921.00.

(R.

50).

Appellant was only under doctors care for a few
months, with no evidence produced that his injury affected
him past November, 1975 (R. 104,110).
Application was made for assistance with appellant
indicating that he intended to make Utah his home (R. 118).

on

each application signed and submitted by appellant, the

appellant stated that he did not own any land, acreage,
or buildings in which he did not live

(R. 67).
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In December of 1976, the respondent learned
that the appellant did in fact own real property in Muleshoe,
Texas, valued at $10,580.00, whereupon the respondent
commenced this action against the appellant.
In June of 1977, respondent filed a complaint
alleging that appellant had fraudulently received food
stamp and financial aid assistance.

Later, the food stamp

allegation was dropped by the respondent because of the
different regulations governing food stamp assistance.
However, the claim against the appellant for fraudulently
receiving financial aid was vigorously prosecuted and was
not decided until trial by the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould.
During the trial on September 27, 1979, and October
1, 1979, testimony was adduced that appellant was not fluent
in English.

However, further testimony established:

(1)

Millie Rodriquez Valencia, who speaks Spanish, and was
associated with the Migrant Council, admitted she notarized
appellant's financial aid application on November 17, 1975

(R. 143 and 145);

(2) An interpreter at the Assistance

Payments Administration (APA) Office assisted the appellant
and his wife in answering questions on.the public assistance
forms

(R. 166); and (3) The Migrant Council and the APA

had an agreement that the Migrant Council would assist
Spanish speaking m.igrants in filling out public assistance
forms

(R. 133-134).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Contrary to what appellant alleges in his statement
of facts, the trial record makes clear that the appellant
never made any reference at trial about whether an APA
representative asked him about his owning a home in Muleshoe,
Texas.
In October of 1979, Judge Calvin Gould concluded
that the payments by the respondent to the appellant of
$2,921.00 in financial aid was the result of a factual
error and not fraud but that the cash payments to appellant
by the state would not have been made had the respondent
known or understood that the appellant in fact owned a home
and real property in Texas

(R.

82).

Thus, the District

Judge entered a judgment against the appellant for $2,921.00
plus costs

(R. 83).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HE OWNED
NON-EXEMPT REAL PROPERTY IN MULESHOE,
TEXAS.
The issue presented to this court in the instant

case is whether Mr. Toscano was eligible to receive financial
assistance.

Appellant attempts to confuse this issue as

discussed in his brief by urging this court to adopt
regulations governing food stamp eligibility to be applied
equally to situations involving financial assistance.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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This

position is an improper interpretation and application
of the two distinct programs.
Testimony was presented at trial (R. 115-121)
which pointed out the distinction of the two programs and
that Food Stamp Regulations do not apply to financial cases,
though both types of assistance might be received by the
same individual at the same time.

This testimony is unrefut~d

in the record and is summarized as follows:
(1)

Each type of assistance has its own unique

eligibility requirements.
(2)

Food Stamp assistance is governed exclusively

by regulations promulgated by the United State Department
of Agriculture, while cash assistance is governed exclusively

by regulations promulgated by the United States Department
of Health, Education and Welfare.
3.

The State of Utah's financial assistance regulations

are promulgated under Volume II and Food Stamp regulations
are contained in Volume IV of the Assistance Payments Administration volumes.
The State of Utah, in essence to receive federal
funds to aid in programs designed to help the disadvantaged
administer the programs from separate federal agencies.
Food stamps used to be distributed through the Post Office
of the United States.

No one would contend that the state

regulations as promulgated for financial assistance in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Volume II would have applied to the Post Office.

The fact

that APA is handling two distinct programs for two distinct
federal departments likewise does not authorize anyone to
say that specific provisions from one programs apply acrossthe-board to another program.

Yet, this is what counsel for

the appellant is attempting to argue.
Therefore, if one tries to confuse the issue of
this case by comingling two different types of assistance
regulations, it is analogous to mixing oil with water.
They don't mix and will separate to original groups that
existed before the attempted mix.

The food stamp assistance

and financial assistance regulations were intended to be
separate and independent of one another.

When Mr. Toscano

applied for financial assistance, he applied on a separate
application.

His approval for financial assistance was made

in compliance with the regulations of Volume II of the Utah
rules.

Volume IV was never considered in approving Mr.

Toscano's financial application.

Thus, only the financial

assistance regulations should govern this case.
The financial assistance regulations applicable
to this case are stated as follows in Volume II, Section
410.1:
§410.l Exempt Assets:
1.

One home and lot owned or being purchased
and occupied by the applicant or recipient,
including a mobile home. (Emphasis added).
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a.

If the home is owned or being purchased,
the lot on which the home stands shall
not exceed the average size of residential
lots for the community in which it is
located.
The amount of property exceeding
an average-size lot shall not be considered exempt property.

b.

When an individual owns but does not
occupy a mobile home, the equity value
of the mobile home shall not be considered
except personal property.

It is -interesting to note that the only inaccurate
information supplied by Mr. Toscano on his financial aid
application is the information that was most essential in
determining whether Mr. Toscano was eligible for financial
assistance.
application.

All other information was accurate on his
Therefore, if Mr. Toscano would have answered

correctly the question concerning his owning real property;
the issue of whether or not he occupied his home in Muleshoe,
Texas, during the period he received financial assistance
and living in Utah, would not be before this court now.
The financial assistance regulations, supra, state
that a lot and home to be exempt must be occupied by the
applicant or recipient.

In addition, it is important to

point out that Volume II contains no special regulations
covering migrants; hence, migrant status is irrelevant to
determining eligibility for financial assistance and a
migrant must qualify the same as any other applicant (R. 115).
Whether Mr. Toscano was or was not a migrant is consequently
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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not at issue.

To have his home exempted for financial

assistance purposes, it must be the home he occupies.
In December, 1975, when Mr. Toscano applied for
financial assistance and during the months Mr. Toscano
received financial assistance, he did not occupy the home
and lot in Muleshoe, Texas.

(R. 22 and 23).

It is pointed

out that Volume II does not define the term occupied, but
it is submitted that the general dictionary definition is
applicable.

Webster's Dictionary (1974 ed.) at 794, defines

occupy as "to reside in as an owner or tenant."

This is

the same definition that the APA office has used in determining
one's eligibility.

The following statements made by Mr.

Larson at trial show this to be correct:
Mr. Barclay:

"Is there a definition as to
what it means to be occupied
in the regulation?"

Mr. Larson:

"Not specifically.
Occupied is
generally assumed to mean that
the individual is living in the
home."

Mr. Barclay:

"That is the application applied
by your agency?"

Mr. Larson:

"Yes."

(R.

117).

Even though the insurance cases cited by appellant
are not very applicable to the present situation, these
cases still uphold the definition of occupied as a place
"in actual use by human beings who are living in it as a
place of habitation ... ",

(Independent Fire Insurance Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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v. Butler, 362 So.2d 980, 982 (1978).

The appellant was

not living in his home in Muleshoe, Texas, when he received
financial assistance payments in Utah.

(Amarillo which is

closer to Salt Lake City than Muleshoe is 888 miles from
Salt Lake City; see also Mr. Toscano's affidavit, R. 22).
It may be true that appellant visited Muleshoe, Texas, on
occasion, however, this does not mean he occupied the home
in Muleshoe.
Counsel for respondent himself feels the absurdity
of this argument of appellant from his own personal experience.
Counsel was born and raised in Freeport, Illinois, approximately
1360 miles away from Provo, Utah.

After graduation from

High School counsel attended Brigham Young University for
four years of undergraduate study.

Except for a few belongings,

clothes, etc., counsel's entire belongings remained at his
parents' home in Illinois for four years.

Counsel lived in

a residential hall for three years and in a private home off
campus for the last year.

At all times he maintained

permanent residence in Illinois at his parents and in fact
visited his permanent residence at Christmastime, summertime
(going to and coming from jobs away from that home) . . He
received mail there that entire time, had his belongings
there, and even voted there by "absentee ballot."
To say that counsel for respondent "occupied" the
home in Illinois at the same time he was living (even temporarily)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-9Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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in Provo, Utah, is inconceivable.
his room in the residence hall?

was he not "occupying"
Certainly he was and the

court should reject any theory to the contrary.
Appellant is obviously trying to confuse the
issue~

He is trying to urge this court to accept the position

that a person does not "occupy" the place where he sleeps,
stays or resides during the period in this case, but somehow
is in two places at once and therefore qualifies for assistance.
The record is clear that the principle residence where the appellant lived, ate, slept, stayed - during the
period of December, 1975, through June, 1976, was in Utah.
There is no evidence or testimony directly substantiating
that appellant even went back to Texas during the time he
was receiving financial assistance.

However, even if

appellant did return to Texas, the visits were short and·
infrequent because appellant's financial assistance checks
were all mailed to his residence in Utah and cashed in Utah.
How could he be occupying his home in Texas and living
there if he was cashing his checks in Utah.
Appellant also argues that even though he was
not physically living in the Muleshoe home, his children
were living there.

This statement made by appellant makes

no difference in determining whether appellant was eligible
for financial assistance because the financial assistance
regulations specifically state that a home to be exempt
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may -10=
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must be occupied by the applicant or recipient of the
assistance, in this case Salvador Toscano.
Section 410.1.)

(Volume II,

Therefore, Judge Calvin Gould did not abuse

his discretion in deciding that the home in Muleshoe, Texas,
was a non-exempt asset.
Since the home in Muleshoe was a non-exempt resource
and had a value of $10,580.00, this resource if reported
would have made Mr. Toscano ineligible for financial assistance
and the respondent would not have paid the same to appellant.
POINT II
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO PROVE BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT
COMMITTED FRAUD DOES NOT MEAN APPELLANT
WAS WITHOUT FAULT IN SUPPLYING INCORRECT
INFORMATION ON HIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
APPLICATION.
Appellant appears to have asserted certain positions
in his brief which are not substantiated by the record.
Respondent feels it important to point them out.

For example,

appellant states that the APA off ice had no staff members
fluent in Spanish.

This statement is incorrect and not in

harmony with the unrefuted trial testimony of Mr. Larson:
Mr. Larson:

I am aware of one individual .
who has been an employee for a
number of years back prior t6
'75.
He does speak Spanish."

Mr. Ayala:

"So basically we are sure that
we have one person among 60 people
that does speak Spanish, am I
correct?"

II
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Mr. Larson:

"Yes, at least one. And I think
at the time there was another
Spanish American girl."

Mr. Ayala:

"But you are sure of one anyway,
am I correct?"

Mr. Larson:

"Yes."

(R. 124).

From the above dialogue it is evident that there
was at least one person who could speak fluent Spanish at
the APA office during the period when Mr. Toscano applied
for financial assistance.

The record also shows that the

APA off ice personnel would ask for an interpreter to assist
them if someone came in the office who was unable to speak
English.

(R. 112 and 113).

Therefore, if Mr. Toscano's

application was filled out at the APA office there would
have been an interpreter available to him.

{Note:

It is

not clear from the record whether Mr. Toscano filled out
his financial application at the Migrant Council's office
or at the APA's office.)
Appellant also makes the statement that the
record shows him to be without faults in applying for
financial assistance.
trial judge.

Such a finding was never made by the

Judge Calvin Gould only determined that the

respondent did not carry his heavy burden of proving
appellant's fraud by clear and convincing evidence.

(See

Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (1978), for burden placed
on one proving fraud).

Thus, not being able to prove the
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heavy burden of fraud, does not mean the appellant was without
fault.

The Washington Supreme Court stated the following

concerning one's burden in providing fraud:
Fraud, therefore, is never presumedi to be
clear, cogent and convincing, the evidence
must be greater than a mere preponderance.
Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage Company,
76 Wash.2d 388, 457 P.2d 535,539 (1969).
In the present case, respondent was unable to
more than a preponderance;

prov~

still substantial evidence and

testimony was presented at the trial showing that Mr. Toscano
was not blameless when he supplied the inaccurate information
on his financial application.

Below are a few of the points

showing that Mr. Toascao was not without fault:
(1) Millie Rodriquez

Valencia, a member of the

Migrant Council who speaks Spanish notarized appellant's
financial aid application (R. 143 and 145);
(2) An interpreter whose native language is Spanish
was available to assist the appellant in filling out his
financial assistance application at the APA off ice (R. 123
and 124);
(3) On all of appellant's applications and reapplications for public assistance, Mr: Toscano answered
all of the questions correctly except the question that would
make him ineligible for financial assistance (R. 119 and 120);
and
(4) If Mr. Toscano did not understand a question on
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the financial assistance application as it was being
interpreted for him then he should have made some effort
to have the question clarified or at t,he very least he
should have let the interpreter know that he didn't
understand the question.
Maybe, the above are not enough to meet the heavy
burden of proving fraud; however, the above points should
indicate that Mr. Toscano was not without fault in supplying
the incorrect information.
Appellant, in Point II of his brief also makes a
policy argument that the respondent should not be allowed
to collect administrative error overpayments.

First of all,

Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-24 specifically authorizes
the Department to collect administrative overpayments.

Second,

there is no evidence or finding by the court that this matter
was in fact an administrative error.

Third, with the non-

reporting of ownership of a home, with the state not having
knowledge of the ownership, administrative error is a false
classification anyway.

As such, respondent rejects this

argument as totally improper.
As the United State Supreme Court said:
Conflicting claims of morality and
intelligence are raised by opponents and
proponents of almost every measure, certainly
including the one before us.
But the
intractable economic, social, and even
philosophical problems presented by public
welfare assistance programs are not the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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business of this Court ....
In the same case the United States Supreme Court reiterates
the same point by stating:
... the Constitution does not empower this
Court to second-guess state officials
charged with the difficult responsibility
of allocating limited public welfare funds
among the myriad of potential recipients.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487
(1970).
Funds paid to a recipient which should not be paid
because of ineligibility takes away from those who legitimately
deserve aid.

Appellant is requesting this Court to legislate

whether the state should collect the overpaid funds as was
evidenced at trial.

That is not the purpose of this court.

In the case of Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc.,
21 Utah2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) this court said:
Cognizant of the contending forces,
we must realize the field in which the
court operates is limited.
It does not
lie within the province of the court to
pass upon the wisdom, the need or the
desirability of any legislation, nor to
choose between two opposing political
philosophies.
It is not the function
of the court to ameliorate the conditions
of those in want, nor is its purpose
to solve the economic, social or
religious problems and dissensions
which beset society.
The court is not
the conscience of the State or its
people.
It does not fall within its
duty to express the personal desires
or philosophy of its personnel.
The court does not determine who
is large or who is small nor who is
rich or who is poor.
It operates upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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a state of facts to effect justice between
contending parties and interests all in
accordance with established legal and
equitable rules and regulations.
The court must voluntarily restrain
itself by holding strictly to an exercise
and expression of its delegated or innate
power to interpret and adjudicate. We
have been called upon to state what the
law is and not what we think it should be.
The question as to whether the statute in
question is or is not economically sound
or beneficial is not for the court to
decide, but such an inquiry is a matter for
the legislature.
(Emphasis added.)
See also Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah2d 138, 434 P.2d 449
(1967); Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching

Co~,

18 Utah2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, rehearing 18 Utah2d 276, 421 P.2d
504 (1966).
Therefore, respondent respectfully urges this Court
to pass the issue of the feasibility or the wisdom of collecting
administrative error overpayments since that was not an
issue at trial.
POINT III
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS THAT WERE NOT RAISED
IN THE PLEADINGS NOR PUT IN ISSUE AT THE
TRIAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST
TIME ON APPEAL.
The arguments raised in appellant's third and fourth
points as well as this request for relief sought regarding
retroactive benefits, are being presented for the first time
on appeal.

These arguments were never placed in issue in any
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form through pleadings, motions, or at the trial.

The Utah

Supreme Court has stated the following concerning matters
raised for the first time on appeal;

"matters neither raised

in the pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered
for the first time on appeal."

Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d

366, 482 P.2d 702, 704 (1971).

See also, Park City Utah

Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 450
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405

(Utah 1978); Edgar v.

(Utah 1977) and others too numerous to

cite.
In reiterating this position, the Utah Supreme
Court stated the following in a recent welfare fraud decision:
"We have consistently held that matters not raised in the
trial court will not be considered by this Court on appeal."
Department of Social Services v. Lester Romero a/k/a Ralph

G. Romero, No. 16551, Slip op. at 2 (Utah, filed March 20,
19 80) •

Regarding the relief sought on appeal, there has
never been any showing that the appellant was ever denied
any benefits which could be considered retroactive.
record is void of any such evidence.

The evidence, in fact,

points to the situation that appellant received
the state is claiming he was overpaid.

The

fund~

which

Respondent cannot

understand how there could be "retroactive" payments since
everything had been paid.

The question is whether appellant

should pay back the benefits received.
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POINT IV
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE.
Since the doctrine of estoppel is by its very
nature equitable; it cannot be invoked unless the party
asserting it is completely without fault.

See Newton v.

Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978);
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976).

In

Point II of this brief, it was shown that the appellant
was not completely without fault in his supplying the incorrect
information on his financial assistance application.

Thus,

the appellant should not be allowed to use the doctrine of
equitable estoppel in this case.
In addition, it is important to note that estoppels
against the public are seldom allowed.

Corpis Juris Secundum

states:
Estoppels against the public are little
favored.
They should not be invoked except
in rare and unusual circumstances, and may
not be invoked where they would operate to
defeat the effective operation of a policy
adopted to protect the public.
They must
be applied with circumspection, and should
be applied only in those special cases
where the interests of justice clearly
require it." C.J.S. §138 Estoppel 675,
676.
The present case is not one of those rare cases in which an
estoppel should be invoked against the government because
(1)

the appellant was not without fault,

(2) an estoppel in
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this case would defeat the state's policy of collecting
overpayments,

(3) the state approved the appellant's

financial assistance application without knowledge of its
inaccuracy, and (4)

" ... an act or representation made through

innocent mistake is not a ground for estoppel."

28 Am.Jur.2d

Estoppel and Waiver §44 (1971).
In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695,
697 (Utah 1976), this Court sets forth the elements of
equitable estoppel as follows:
Estoppel arises when a party by his acts,
representations, or admissions, or by
his silence when he ought to speak,
intentionally or through culpable negligence, induces another to believe certain
facts to exist and that such other acting
with reasonable prudence and diligence,
relies and acts thereon so that he will
suffer an injustice if the former is
permitted to deny the existence of such
facts.
See also, J.P. Koch, Inc. v.
J.C. Penney Co. Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah
19 7 5) .
In the present case, it is clear that the appellant
has failed to carry his burden of showing that the respondent
intentionally or through culpable negligence induced the
appellant to believe certain facts that did not exist.

At

most one could only argue that the respondent had made an
innocent mistake in approving the appellant's financial
assistance application.

Even this argument is tenuous,

because respondent. would not have approved the application
had appellant given the correct information concerning his
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home in Muleshoe, Texas.
However, in regard to estoppel against an innocent
mistake 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §44 (1971) states:
It is held that where the conduct or
representation of the party sought to
be estopped is due to ignorance founded
upon innocent mistake, no estoppel will
arise.
Ordinarily, estoppel will not
arise from a mutual mistake of the parties
as to which they are equally at fault.
At most one could argue that the present case is a mutual
mistake where both parties were at fault.

However, even

under this argument is would be extremely difficult to
rationalize that appellant's fault in supplying incorrect
information was less than or equal to respondent's fault
in approving the financial aid application.

Therefore,

even under the most tenuous arguments the doctrine of
equitable estoppel is not applicable to this case.
POINT V
APPELLANT'S INTERVIEW FOR FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE DID NOT INFRINGE ON APPELLANT'S
RIGHTS OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT.
Appellant begins the fourth point of his brief
on the assumption that his interview for financial assistance
was conducted in English.

However, in making this assumption

appellant fails to cite any part of the record substantiating
his claim.

In fact when the record is closely scrutinized

the opposite is found to be correct.

Although it is true
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that appellant's financial aid application was approved by
an English speaking individual, this does not mean the
approval was conducted without the aid of an interpreter.
The record shows that during the time the appellant applied
for assistance, the APA office had an interpreter whose
native tongue was Spanish.

(R. 123 and 124).

The record

also shows that the interpreter would help non-English
speaking individuals complete their public assistance forms.
(R.

135).
In the present case it is not clear whether

appellant's financial assistance application was completed
at the APA office or at the Migrant Council office because
the approval date of appellant's financial aid application
was not the date when the application was filled out.
127). The application was probably
day or on the day it was notarized.

co~pleted

(R.

prior to the

On November 17, 1975,

Millie Rodriquez Valencia, who reads and speaks both Spanish
and English, notarized appellant's financial assistance
application.

(R. 143 and 145).

Therefore, it is conceivable

that Millie Valencia assisted the appellant in completing
his financial assistance form.

If Miliie Valencia d~d not

aid the appellant in filling out the form, then the next
most likely place where migrants filled out public assistance
forms was at the Migrant Council office.

(R. 133 and 134).

The Migrant Council kept public assistance forms in their
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

office and had an agreement between the APA office that
their Spanish speaking employees would assist Spanish
speaking migrants in completing their public assistance forms.
(R. 133 and 134).

If appellant's assistance form was completed

without the help of Millie Valencia and the Migrant Council,
then the form was completed with the help of an interpreter
at the APA office.

In any event, appellant's financial

assistance application was not completed without an interpreter,
for someone not knowing or understanding English certainly
would not understand the form to answer the question regarding
prior employment, insurance companies, or question 18 wherein
is written by hand "Salvador P. Toscano - torn cartilage, left
knee."

The knowledge of such English words shows some know-

ledge or help.
In order to have this court rule as a matter of
law that which appellant seeks, is not proper here.

There is

no evidence sufficient to support the contentions claimed.
What appellant requests this court to hold (because this is
all that the evidence supports) is that it is a denial of
equal protection for a Spanish speaking person to be held
accountable for filling out and application form.

Such a

request is beyond this case.
As has been pointed out, there is no evidence that
arnn-English speaking person helped fill out the form, or
that the appellant filled it out himself.

As such, appellant

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

desires this court to invent some facts which would substantiate
his position.

This should be rejected.
CONCLUSION

The appellant makes many assumptions throughout
his brief which he fails to support by citing the record.
As a result, when the record is carefully examined many of
appellant's assumptions are found to be without foundation.
For example, the record makes clear that the appellant had
an interpreter available to him when he filled out his financial
·assistance application.

(See Point V of this brief).

However,

even though appellant had an interpreter assisting him, he
still supplied incorrect information concerning his home in
Muleshoe, Texas.

Since the incorrect information made appellant

eligible for financial assistance, the State paid the same to
him.
In this case the State is only collecting from the
appellant, money which would have never been given to the
appellant had the appellant supplied the correct information
in the first place.

Thus, a ruling in respondent's behalf

will be a ruling in favor of giving as$istance only to those
that are entitled to receive it.
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Respondent respectfully urges the court to sustain
the lower court who was able to make its decision based on
the evidence introduced.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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